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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the Bosman ruling plays an important role in the market for native 
soccer players. Through the abolition of transfer fees after the expiration of contracts, as well as 
the liberalization of the migration of professional soccer players within the European Union, the 
Bosman ruling could negatively impact the number of national players participating in their 
national leagues. To explore this issue, we use data on the First Division of the Spanish League 
for the seasons 1980/1981 to 2011/2012. Results point to a decline in the number of native 
Spanish players after the Bosman ruling, although the impact does not appear to be permanent. 
This finding is consistent with the use of different subsamples, and to the introduction of 
controls for unobserved characteristics varying at the team level or over time, and to observed 
characteristics such as GDP per capita, population, the age of players, and potential TV 
revenues. This work also explores the impact of other, similar legislative changes, such as the 
Kolpak case and the Cotonou agreement, which appeared in the post-Bosman period. In 
addition, we incorporate empirical evidence of the potential impact that the Bosman ruling may 
have on the performance of the Spanish players. Our findings indicate that the Bosman case has 
had a negative impact on the number of minutes played and on the participation of national 
players in the first team, suggesting that an average Spanish player is less important to his team. 
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1- Introduction 
 
Although the analysis of the relationship between economics and sports has grown 
considerably in recent decades (Andreff and Szymanski 2006), labor market research 
remains an important area in this field because of the opportunity that professional sport 
offers for the analysis of labor market changes (Kahn 2000), especially in recent years 
with the increase of athlete migrations across countries. As Andreff (2006) explains, the 
international migration of sportsmen and sportswomen increased substantially during 
the 1990s with the liberalization of the labor market for professional athletes in the 
major European leagues, and the increasing South-North movement of athletes. This 
pattern is clearly observed in professional soccer, one of the most popular and 
globalized sports (Karaca 2008 and Milanovic 2005). As of the 2014 season, the 
percentage of foreign players is around 59.3% in the English Premier League, 54.8% in 
the Italian Calcio, 43.5% in the German Bundesliga, 38.9% in the Spanish Liga, and 
31.6% in the French Ligue 1 (CIES Football Observatory 2014). Several studies have 
analyzed the implications of the rise in the number of foreigners in the professional 
soccer leagues, mainly exploring the relationship between the number of foreigners in 
domestic leagues and the performance of the national team (Álvarez et al. 2011 and 
Berlinschi et al. 2013). Less work has been done on the study of the determinants of the 
decline in the number of native players in these leagues. In this paper, we examine 
whether the Bosman ruling has played a role in the decrease of the percentage of native 
players. 
The ruling of the European Court of Justice, in December 1995, involved the 
liberalization of the migration of professional sportsmen and sportswomen within the 
EU, and the abolition of transfer fees after the expiration of contracts (see Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, Case C-415/93).1 The ECJ considered that 
sporting activities did not constitute an exception to the provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome, in contrast to the opinion of the European Football Federation, UEFA, that held 
that soccer was not an economic activity and therefore not subject to the Treaty 
regarding freedom of movement (see Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) for a review of the 
Bosman ruling). After this ruling, clubs lost their power over players and talented soccer 
players had the market power to choose to play for the team that offered the highest 
                                                            
1 Prior to the Bosman ruling, the European soccer clubs, were restricted by the 3+2 rule that allowed only 
three foreign soccer players in each team, plus two other foreigners provided they had lived in the host 
country for five years. 
salary. Then, there is a transfer of property rights from the clubs to the soccer players. 
Additionally, the elimination of quotas in the number of foreign players for EU-national 
teams could result in a significant migration of soccer players, and thus a reallocation of 
soccer players. Even the UEFA Chief Executive, Lars-Christer Olsson, in 2005, ten 
years after the Bosman ruling, said the decision ruined soccer’s values and has led to the 
abandonment of home-grown talent (The Telegraph, 13 December 2005). 
According to the Coase Theorem, without transaction costs, this reallocation of 
ownership rights should have no effect, as in the case of the elimination of the “reserve 
clause” in the US (Quirk and Fort 1992). However, the economic literature on this issue 
indicates that the Coasian approach does not hold for professional team sports in 
Europe, suggesting that the source of inefficiency is generated by the free-riding of big 
clubs on the talent development of the small clubs (Ericson 2000). We add to this 
research by examining the applicability of the Coase Theorem to the impact of the 
Bosman ruling on the market for native soccer players. Of course, it is not the first time 
the consequences of the Bosman case in sports economics have been explored. Certain 
papers have focused on analyzing the impact of this case on player migration in 
professional soccer (Frick 2009), as well as the impact on the quality of the soccer 
leagues (Ericson 2000, Flores et al. 2010), on the decreasing competitive balance 
(Kesenne 2007, Vrooman 2007), on player salary levels (Kesenne 2007) and, more 
recently, analyzing the effect on national teams (Binder and Findlay 2012). Here, we 
examine the Spanish case, considering the evolution of domestic players in the Spanish 
League. 
The Spanish Soccer League First Division is considered one of the Big 5 leagues 
in the world (CIES Football Observatory 2014). Many of the most talented players in 
the world want to play in Spain since several of these teams are considered by UEFA to 
be the best clubs in Europe, primarily due to their historically high success rate in 
European competitions (Barros et al. 2008, and UEFA Classification of Clubs). Thus, 
the liberalization of the soccer player market in Europe following the Bosman ruling 
could generate an increase in the signings of international players by Spanish clubs 
which may displace the participation of Spanish players in their own league. In order to 
explore this issue, we use data from the bdfutbol webpage and the Spanish Professional 
Soccer League.2 The sample considered covers the period from the 1980/81 season to 
                                                            
2 This dataset was collected by the author of this work and his/her assistants from the webpage 
http://www.bdfutbol.com/ and from the Spanish Professional Soccer League. 
the 2011/12 season. Our results suggest that the impact of the Bosman ruling on the 
percentage of Spanish players was not permanent; after 9-10 years, no effect can be 
discerned when controlling for unobserved characteristics that vary at the team level, 
and over time.  
In this work, we have made additional efforts to check whether our findings are 
robust and consistent by repeating the analysis using different subsamples, for example, 
by excluding the two most important clubs in the Spanish League (and in Europe, 
following UEFA’s classification), Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. Our results do not 
vary. The effect of the Bosman case also remains unchanged if more controls are added 
to the analysis, such as per-capita GDP measured at the regional level, and other 
variables related to potential TV revenues. These variables can be correlated with the 
outcome of interest, and for this reason, if omitted, our estimates could be biased. Other 
legislative changes in the post-Bosman period have also been taken into account, to test 
whether our estimates capture the effect of the Bosman ruling in addition to - or instead 
of - the effect of other cases. For example, the Kolpak-Nihat-Simutenkov cases 
extended the Bosman ruling to non-EU nationals (Penn 2006), those linked to the EU by 
either a European association agreement (such as EU candidate countries) and/or a trade 
and cooperation agreement, and the Cotonou agreement, signed in 2000 by the EU and 
several African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. It is comforting that, even after adding 
all these possible determinants of the evolution of Spanish professional soccer players, 
results on the impact of the Bosman ruling are the same, pointing to a transitory effect 
on Spanish national players. 
Not only do we study the role of the Bosman ruling in the participation of 
Spanish soccer players in their own league, but we also explore the behavior of these 
Spanish players. As suggested by Álvarez et al. (2011), importing foreign talent may 
improve the behavior of the national teams, which should be consistent with the 
spillover hypothesis. In our case, we consider the performance of all national players, 
not only those participating in the national teams. Results suggest that, after the Bosman 
ruling, the participation of the national players in the first team in each match, and the 
number of minutes played by the Spanish players, decreases, which is not surprising 
since the number of Spanish players decreased. Regarding goals scored, we observe no 
significant coefficients during the early post-Bosman period, which may point to no 
differences in the competitiveness of Spanish and foreign players, but this effect 
changes in the medium and long term, coinciding with the period in which the effect of 
the Bosman ruling on the percentage of Spanish players is not statistically significant. 
All this suggests that, although in the long-term the percentage of Spanish players is not 
affected by the Bosman ruling, the average national players have lost some degree of 
importance in the first team as a direct result of that ruling, and are mainly used as the 
reserves. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we show our main results, and Section 5 
presents our conclusions. 
 
2- Empirical Strategy 
 
To identify the impact of the Bosman ruling on the participation of Spanish players in 
the Spanish League First Division, we first consider a static approach in which the 
impact is considered as a break in the series, formally: 
PlayerSpae,t = βBosmane,t + Σe TeamFE e + Σ Team e *Time t+ 
+  ΣTeam e * Time t2  + u e,t        (1) 
where the dependent variable, PlayerSpae,t, represents the percentage of Spanish players 
over the total team players of club e in year t. The explanatory variable Bosmane,t   is a 
dummy variable that takes value "1" when team e is affected by the Bosman ruling in 
year t, and takes value "0" otherwise. The parameter β is interpreted as the mean change 
in the percentage of Spanish players that can be due to the Bosman case. From a 
theoretical point of view, we would expect that the elimination of transfer fees after the 
expiration of contracts and the liberalization of migration of EU soccer players, 
decrease the costs of signing-up international players, which should have a negative 
impact on the participation of Spanish players. Nevertheless, this open access to EU 
national soccer players can lead to greater demands for high salaries by talented players, 
which can increase the cost of the signings, and thus it may have a positive impact on 
the number of Spanish players. Then, the sign of β is not theoretically clear. Equation 1 
also includes team fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics, such as club 
differences, and linear and quadratic team-specific time trends that allow us to capture 
unobservable characteristics that vary over time, and whose omission could lead to bias 
in the estimates. 
If the effects of the Bosman case vary over time, this methodology would not be 
appropriate to capture the effect of that ruling. To solve this issue, we propose the use of 
a dynamic model à la Wolfers (Wolfers 2006), formally: 
 
PlayerSpae,t = Σk βk Bosmane,t,k + Σe TeamFE e + Σ Team e *Time t+ 
+  ΣTeam e * Time t2  + u e,t      (2) 
 
with Bosmane,t  being a dummy that takes value "1" when team e has been affected by 
the Bosman ruling in year t for k periods, and "0" otherwise. These variables capture the 
dynamic response of the percentage of players of Spanish nationality to the Bosman 
ruling. The above controls are maintained, allowing us to capture pre-existing trends. 
The negative sign of these β parameters indicates that the percentage of Spanish players 
has decreased after k periods since the Bosman case. The interpretation of a positive 
sign is the opposite. 
 
3- Data 
 
We use data from the First Division of the Spanish Professional League for the seasons 
1980/81 to 2011/12, collected from the bdfutbol webpage and from the website of the 
Spanish Professional Soccer League. The database was compiled by the author of this 
analysis and his/her assistants. Our sample consists of individuals whose first reported 
nationality is Spanish, and who have participated in at least two matches (in the first 
team or as a reserve) in the First Division of the Spanish League. We choose this sample 
to avoid the incorporation of soccer players who have participated in the matches for 
unexpected reasons, unrelated to the Bosman case, such as injuries to other players, 
strikes of soccer players, and so on. In those situations, players from junior teams 
substitute for the professional players and their inclusion in our sample could lead to 
biased results, by increasing the number of Spanish players.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the percentage of Spanish players in the Spanish 
league, our variable of interest. We observe that in the pre-Bosman period, the 
percentage of Spanish players slightly increases from 88% in the 1980/81 season to 
90% in the 1985/86 season. From that period on, the participation of Spanish players 
decreases, with that being around 79% in the season 1995/96. After the Bosman ruling, 
the percentage of Spanish players sharply declines to 60% in the 1997/98 season, but 
then recovers its previous importance with the rate being almost 75% in the 2002/03 
season, and even higher in the 2004/05 season, to around 76%. Then, the percentage of 
Spanish players in the Spanish league smoothly declines to around 65% in the last 
seasons considered. If it is, in fact, the Bosman ruling that is operating here, we should 
observe an increase in the presence of EU national soccer players. For example, as can 
be seen in Figure 2, in some cases, EU nationals increase their participation in the 
Spanish league after the Bosman ruling; the percentage of French and Portuguese 
players, for example, rises dramatically. We also observe an increase in the number of 
soccer players from the Netherlands and Italy. Less clear is the impact of the Bosman 
ruling in the case of players from Germany, the United Kingdom, and Denmark. 
This quick glance at the evolution of the participation of Spanish players in 
Professional soccer appears to reveal a negative impact of the Bosman ruling, at least in 
the short term. However, some years after that ruling, the evolution of the percentage of 
Spaniard players follows a similar trend to that detected in the pre-Bosman period, 
suggesting that pre-existing trends could be driving the evolution of Spanish players in 
the post-Bosman period (see Figure 1). A more rigorous analysis is needed to examine 
this issue, as presented in the following section. We first choose only a sample that 
includes those teams that have participated in the Spanish league for at least 5 seasons 
in the pre- and post-Bosman periods, to mitigate the negative impact of the participation 
in the Second Division of the Spanish League may have on the revenues of the clubs, 
that negatively impacts the capacity to sign-up international, talented players. Our 
sample incorporates 462 observations from 18 different teams for the period 1980/81 to 
2011/12.3 Note that the results are maintained, as we discuss below, when we change 
this sample, for example, to include all teams in the analysis. 
 
4- Results 
4.1 Main Results and Robustness Checks 
 
                                                            
3 The clubs considered are: Athletic Club de Bilbao (32 seasons), Atlético de Madrid (30 seasons), FC 
Barcelona (32 seasons), Real Betis Balompié (25 seasons), Celta de Vigo (19 seasons), Club Deportivo 
Espanyol (30 seasons), Real Club Deportivo Mallorca (21 seasons), Atlético Osasuna (26 seasons), Real 
Racing de Santander (23 seasons), Real Madrid CF (32 seasons), Real Oviedo (13 seasons), Real 
Sociedad (29 seasons), Real Zaragoza (30 seasons), Sevilla FC (29 seasons), Real Sporting de Gijón (22 
seasons), Club Deportivo Tenerife (12 seasons), Valencia CF (31 seasons), and Real Valladolid CF (26 
seasons). 
Table 1 shows the estimates for Equation (1). In the first column, the Bosman case is 
associated with a decline in the percentage of Spanish players in the Spanish league. 
This is maintained even after adding team-specific linear and quadratic time trends in 
Columns (2) and (3), although the estimated coefficient of the effect of the Bosman 
ruling increases (decreases in absolute value) by almost 50%, after adding those 
controls to the specifications. This is presumably because, in these specifications, we 
are not only eliminating team fixed characteristics but also time-varying unobservable 
factors that could bias the estimates reported in Column (1).  
 Since the analysis presented in the previous section points to a potential dynamic 
response of the Spanish players to the Bosman ruling, we use an alternative dynamic 
strategy to capture the effect of that ruling. Table 2 presents the estimate coefficients for 
Equation (2) in Columns (4), (5) and (6). In all three specifications, the estimated 
coefficients show a negative impact of the Bosman case on the presence of Spanish 
players in the Spanish league, at least in the short term. However, after the introduction 
of the team-specific linear and quadratic time trends that allow us to capture for 
unobservable characteristics that vary across time, the effect fades over subsequent 
years. As can be seen in Column (6), coefficients on the dynamic response turn out not 
to be statistically significant after 9-10 years. Then, our results suggest that the Bosman 
ruling contributed to a decrease in the participation of Spanish soccer players in the 
Spanish league, but that the impact was transitory.  
 To test this further, we provide additional empirical evidence to show that these 
results are not driven by omitted socio-economic variables. We add to the analysis 
controls for per-capita GDP, since the capacity of Spanish teams to sign up international 
soccer players can increase in economic expansions, and decrease during contractions. 
Results on the impact of the Bosman ruling do not vary after the introduction of per-
capita GDP (see Table 2). Column (1) shows the estimates presented in Column (6) of 
Table 1 to clarify the comparison. Note that the sign of the effect of per-capita GDP is 
negative in the first specification, Column (2), but that this changes after the 
introduction of team-specific time trends, Columns (3) and (4), although the effect of 
this variable is not statistically significant when quadratic trends are added. This may 
indicate that results without time trends can be biased since, in those specifications, we 
are not removing unobservable characteristics that vary over time. In all these 
specifications, we also incorporate controls for team characteristics. We add controls for 
the number of previous King’s Cups that the teams have won, and for the number of 
previous Spanish League Championships. We would expect that the greater the number 
of Cups or League Championships, the more likely it is that the team can sign the best 
players, regardless of their nationality. The average age of the team is introduced as a 
control, since international players usually sign up when young, and they normally end 
their careers in their country of origin, or in less competitive leagues; thus, the older a 
team’s average age is, the less likely is that club to sign non-national players. As 
explained above, after adding all these controls, results on the effect of the Bosman case 
are unchanged. 
 During the period analyzed, television (TV) revenues dramatically increased 
(García and Rodríguez 2006). Since a rise in revenues could increase the capacity of the 
clubs to have more international players, it could be argued that we are capturing 
changes in TV revenues in addition to, or instead of, the Bosman case. To tackle this 
issue, although we do not have information on the TV revenues that the teams received 
from private companies, we use as a proxy of possible TV revenues, the regional TV 
stations. From the late 1980s, all but four Spanish regions created public regional TV 
channels (see Table 3). It is worth noting that soccer was one of the main programs for 
those stations, with larger audiences, and the broadcast of a soccer match was often the 
first program (this information is available in most of the regional TV webpages). In 
those cases where these channels do not have the television rights for their regional 
teams, they broadcast friendly matches or give financial support to their regional clubs 
by way of advertisements. Controls for regional TV are incorporated in this analysis in 
Table 4. As previously, Column (1) replicates the estimates presented in Column (6) of 
Table 1, to facilitate the comparison. Column (2) shows the results after introducing a 
dummy for picking up the impact of regional TV, and in Column (3), we add dynamic 
controls for the TV impact. With respect to the findings on the Bosman ruling, it can be 
seen that there are no significant changes. The magnitude of the coefficients varies 
somewhat, but the effect is still transitory, suggesting that after a decade no effect can 
be discerned when team-specific linear and quadratic time trends are added. 
 From the mid and late-1990s, Spanish teams signed individual contracts with 
one of two companies, Sogecable and Audiovisual Sport (García and Rodriguez, 2006). 
This generated important variations in the TV revenues that those clubs received, and it 
could be argued that these differences are driving our results. To probe this further, we 
have repeated the entire analysis  after excluding the two main teams in the league, Real 
Madrid and FC Barcelona, both, according to UEFA Classification, being the winners 
of the majority of competitions and having larger budgets (see Columns (1)-(3) of Table 
5). Once these teams are dropped from the sample, the impact of the Bosman ruling 
dissipates after 5-6 years, when pre-existing trends are controlled for (Column 3). This, 
again, points to a non-permanent effect of the Bosman case. Similarly, we have repeated 
the analysis including all teams that participated in the First Division of the Spanish 
League (see Columns (4) to (6) in Table 5).4 As in previous estimates, results indicate 
that the effect of the Bosman ruling on the participation of Spanish soccer players in the 
Spanish League disappear after 5-6 years, after including all controls. All in all, our 
findings suggest that factors other than the Bosman case are driving the evolution of the 
participation of Spanish soccer players in their own First Division League. 
 
4.2. Is it the Bosman case and/or the Kolpak-Nihat-Simutenkov cases and/or the 
Cotonou Agreement? 
 
Another important event that occurred in the period considered is that the principles 
applied in the Bosman case were extended to consider other non-EU nationals 
originating from “third countries” equal to European Union players (Hendrickx 2005). 
There are several examples of sportsmen attempting to attain that objective; for 
example, the Kolpak case. Kolpak was a Slovak handball player in the German handball 
league.5 In 2000, Slovakia was not a member of the European Union, and therefore the 
Bosman ruling did not apply to their citizens. However, Slovakia had an Association 
Agreement with the European Union. Based on that agreement, in 2003 the European 
Court of Justice ruled in favor of Kolpak, giving equal rights for Slovak sportsmen 
residing and lawfully employed by a club established in a Member State, and 
Community players. Similarly, Simutenkov and Nihat, Russian and Turkish soccer 
players, respectively, participating in the Spanish League, obtained rights equal to 
Community soccer players in 2005 and 2008, respectively (Hendrickx 2005, Penn 
2006).6 In this framework, one can hypothesize that in the mid- and long-term, the 
estimates presented on the effect of the Bosman ruling are also capturing all these cases. 
Nevertheless, by simply plotting the evolution of soccer players originating from some 
of those “third countries” in the Spanish League, see Figure 3, it can be seen that 
                                                            
4 In this case, we have 630 observations. All 46 of these clubs are included in Table 3. 
5 Case C-438/00, Deutsher Handballbund eV vs. Maros Kolpak 
6 Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de 
Fútbol. 
Spanish clubs do not react in the same way after the Bosman case. From the late 1980s 
until the mid-1990s, the numbers of soccer players originating from countries such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Romania, Russia, and Serbia gradually increase. Then, 
there is a decline in the participation of these players in the Spanish League, with their 
representation being lower than 1% by the late 2000s. The evolution of the Turkish 
players is a little different. Their participation rate was almost 0% until the late 1990s, 
but it has increased a little since then. To check for this bias in our main findings, we 
repeat our analysis by adding a dummy variable that takes value “1” since 2003, the 
year of the Kolpak ruling, and “0” otherwise. Considering the impact of the Bosman 
case, we still observe a transitory effect (see Column (2) of Table 6).7 
The non-discrimination principles applied to all these non-EU players were also 
taken into consideration for players from the countries that signed the Cotonou 
Agreement (2007) in the Spanish League.8 In that year, Mahamadou Diarrá from Mali, 
and Ikecukwu Uche from Nigeria, players for Real Madrid and Getafe, respectively, 
asked to be considered as equal to  the EU players in the Spanish Soccer Association, 
because of the Cotonou agreement. These two players were successful in obtaining 
equal rights. As before, one can surmise that this had an impact on the participation of 
Spanish players in the Spanish League, since more individuals were then considered 
equal to EU players. To explore this issue, we have also plotted the evolution of players 
whose countries of origin signed the Cotonou Agreement (see Figure 4).9 Note that, in 
the Spanish League, soccer players originating from those countries represent, in almost 
the whole period, less than 0.5%.10 There is a peak around the 1996/97 season in the 
case of players from Nigeria, which is not surprising, since the Bosman ruling gives an 
opportunity to other foreigners, since EU players are no longer classified as foreign. 
From the late 2000s, once again the number of soccer players from Nigeria, as well as 
those from Ivory Coast, increases. For the rest of the cases, we observe some peaks but 
the pattern is not clear. In order to test whether our estimates are driven by the 
application of the Cotonou Agreement, as in the Kolpak case, we add a dummy variable 
                                                            
7 Column (1) adds Column (6) of Table 1 for easier comparison of results. 
8 It is a partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since 2000, it was the 
framework for the relationships between the EU and 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Pacific (ACP). It also contains a non-discrimination clause with regard to nationality (Hendrickx 2005). 
9 We plot only 6 countries of origin (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, The Congo, Ghana, and 
Nigeria). 
10 In other important leagues such as the Portuguese and the French, the number of soccer player from 
Africa is considerable greater, mainly due to migration from former colonial possessions, (Darby 2007 
and Darby et al. 2007). 
that takes value “1” since 2007, and “0” otherwise. Though the magnitude of the effect 
changes a little, our results, again, indicate that the Bosman case had a non-permanent 
effect on the evolution of Spanish players in the Spanish League (Column (3) of Table 
6).  
 
4.3 The impact of the Bosman case on the behavior of Spanish players 
 
So far, we have empirically studied the Bosman case impact on the participation 
of Spanish players in their own domestic league. We now examine the potential effect 
of the Bosman case on the behavior of Spanish players. To address this issue, we would 
have liked to have information on what motivated soccer players performance, but this 
information is not available. Instead, we explore the evolution of some measures of 
performance. Following Álvarez et al. (2011), we would expect that the skills of local 
soccer players would benefit from contact with a greater number of international players 
signing up as a result of the Bosman case. Then, we would expect that the Bosman case 
would have a positive impact on the performance of Spanish players. However, if clubs 
sign international soccer players with high salaries, it would be expected that those 
players would be part of the first team, rather than the average Spanish players with 
lesser abilities. Hence, Spaniards would play fewer minutes in the matches, and thus 
would be less likely to score goals. 
In Table 7, Column (1) adds Column (6) of Table 1 to clarify the comparison 
with previous findings. In Column (2), the dependent variable is defined as the 
proportion of matches in which an average Spanish player has been in the first team in a 
specific year. The dependent variable in Column (3), is calculated as the average 
minutes per match in which an average Spanish player has played in a specific year, per 
club. In Column (4), we incorporate as dependent variable the average goals per match 
scored by an average Spanish player in a specific year, per club. In the last Column, the 
dependent variable measures the average yellow cards per match received by an average 
Spanish player in a specific year, per club. The estimated coefficients suggest a negative 
impact of the Bosman case on the contribution of Spanish players in the first team, 
although no effect is detected 15 years after the Bosman ruling. Similarly, results also 
indicate that the ruling is negatively associated with the minutes played by Spanish 
players, although, as before, this relationship disappears in the long term. In terms of 
goals scored, we observe that during the early years of the Bosman effect, no 
statistically significant coefficients are obtained, but this changed in the medium and 
long term, coinciding with the period in which the effect of the Bosman ruling on the 
percentage of Spanish players is not statistically significant. No relationship has been 
found between the Bosman case and the number of yellow cards received by Spaniards. 
All in all, our findings suggest that, although the Bosman ruling liberalized the soccer 
player market, that ruling is not the main factor driving the decline in the percentage of 
Spanish players in Spanish clubs, since its effect was transitory. However, since that 
ruling, an average Spanish player participates less in the first team, plays fewer minutes, 
and scores fewer goals, all of which points to a less important role of that player in the 
team.  
 
5- Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of the Bosman ruling on the participation of local 
soccer players in their own league. Since that case implied a reduction in the costs of 
signing international players, via liberalization of the migration of professional players 
within the EU, and through the elimination of transfer fees after the expiration of 
contracts, we would expect the implementation of the ruling to affect the participation 
of domestic players in their own leagues. To run this analysis, we use Spanish data from 
the 1980/81 season to the 2011/12 season. 
 Our results suggest that the Bosman ruling had a negative but transitory effect on 
the percentage of Spanish players participating in their own major League, after 
controlling for pre-existing trends. Our results are consistent, even after adding controls 
for socio-economic variables and characteristics at the team level. The response of the 
Spanish players to the Bosman ruling is also quite robust to the use of different sub-
samples, as well as to the inclusion of other rulings that extend the Bosman case to other 
non-EU nationals, such as the Kolpak case and the Cotonou Agreement. 
 We further examine the impact of that ruling on the performance of Spanish 
players by analyzing its effect on the participation of Spanish players in the first team, 
on the minutes that those individuals play, on the goals scored, and on the yellow cards 
received. We find that both participation in the first team and the minutes played 
decrease, pointing to a greater reserve role of Spanish players, although the effect 
disappears over time. The impact appears to be negative and permanent in the case of 
the goals scored, suggesting a less important role for an average Spanish player after the 
Bosman ruling.  
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Table 1: The impact of the Bosman Case on Spanish Soccer Players 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bosman -17.622*** -8.981*** -8.320*** 
(0.836) (1.300) (1.236) 
Bosman 1-2 -11.512*** -5.066*** -4.958*** 
(1.439) (1.502) (1.561) 
Bosman 3-4 -22.501*** -14.277*** -13.716*** 
(1.627) (1.698) (1.692) 
Bosman 5-6 -20.921*** -10.514*** -10.016*** 
(1.765) (1.799) (1.768) 
Bosman 7-8 -16.972*** -5.461*** -4.309** 
(1.925) (1.897) (1.753) 
Bosman 9-10 -13.948*** -0.620 0.996 
(1.640) (2.021) (1.997) 
Bosman 11-12 -15.011*** 0.628 2.893 
(1.662) (1.988) (2.093) 
Bosman 13-14 -19.829*** -5.030** -1.420 
(2.615) (2.325) (2.385) 
Bosman  >15 -19.904*** -3.198* 1.537 
(1.918) (1.839) (1.955) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Team*Time2 No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.636 0.731 0.763 0.669 0.774 0.802 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. We choose those clubs that 
have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 seasons in the pre-Bosman 
period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period. The dependent variable is defined as the 
percentage of Spanish players per club and year. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 
10% level. 
  
Table 2: The impact of the Bosman Case on Spanish Soccer Players after adding controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bosman 1-2 -4.958*** -7.877*** -6.534*** -5.593*** 
(1.561) (1.701) (1.684) (1.906) 
Bosman 3-4 -13.716*** -18.033*** -16.317*** -14.766*** 
(1.692) (1.954) (1.833) (2.048) 
Bosman 5-6 -10.016*** -14.345*** -12.818*** -11.223*** 
(1.768) (2.337) (2.044) (2.691) 
Bosman 7-8 -4.309** -8.985*** -8.565*** -6.147* 
(1.753) (2.743) (2.435) (3.673) 
Bosman 9-10 0.996 -3.615 -3.677 -0.885 
(1.997) (2.831) (2.806) (4.560) 
Bosman 11-12 2.893 -2.595 -3.095 0.406 
(2.093) (3.335) (3.048) (5.565) 
Bosman 13-14 -1.420 -6.972 -9.813*** -4.805 
(2.385) (4.260) (3.522) (6.703) 
Bosman  >15 1.537 -6.908** -6.828** -1.717 
(1.955) (3.430) (3.021) (6.522) 
GDP per capita -0.680*** 0.337** 0.140 
(0.158) (0.161) (0.291) 
King Cups 1.633*** 1.496*** 1.381*** 
(0.148) (0.114) (0.105) 
Leagues -0.840*** -0.976*** -0.671*** 
(0.131) (0.111) (0.159) 
Mean age of players 1.747*** 1.206*** 0.857** 
(0.370) (0.389) (0.399) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time Yes No Yes Yes 
Team*Time2 Yes No No Yes 
Observations 462 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.802 0.696 0.781 0.805 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. We choose those clubs that 
have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 seasons in the pre-Bosman 
period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period. The dependent variable is defined as the 
percentage of Spanish players per club and year. The GDP per capita is measured in thousands 
of euros. Previous King’s Cups include the number of previous cups. Previous leagues include 
the number of previous league championships. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 
10% level. 
 
Table 3: Classification of Teams by Regional TV 
Teams 
Year of first Broadcast of the 
Regional TV 
Almería, Betis, Cádiz, Granada, Málaga, Recreativo de 
Huelva, Sevilla, Xerez 1989 
Alavés, Athletic Club, Real Sociedad 1982 
Albacete 2001 
Atlético de Madrid, Getafe, Real Madrid, Rayo Vallecano 1989 
Barcelona, Espanyol, Gimnástic de Tarragona, Lleida, Sabadell 1984 
Castellón, Elche, Hércules, Levante, Valencia, Villarreal 1989 
Celta de Vigo, Compostela, Deportivo de la Coruña 1985 
Extremadura, Mérida 2006 
Las Palmas, Tenerife 1999 
Logroñés 19981  
Mallorca 2005 
Murcia 2006 
Numancia, Real Burgos, Salamanca, Valladolid 20091 
Osasuna 19971  
Racing de Santander 19951  
Real Oviedo, Sporting de Gijón 2006 
Real Zaragoza 2006 
Notes:1Private Regional Televisions. The rest of regional television stations obtain their 
funding from their respective Regional Government. Source: Regional Television 
websites. The soccer clubs are classified by the region in which they normally play. 
 
 
 Table 4: The impact of the Bosman Case considering Regional Television 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Bosman 1-2 -4.958*** -4.976*** -5.296*** 
(1.561) (1.562) (1.764) 
Bosman 3-4 -13.716*** -13.748*** -14.873*** 
(1.692) (1.707) (1.920) 
Bosman 5-6 -10.016*** -10.050*** -11.309*** 
(1.768) (1.770) (2.219) 
Bosman 7-8 -4.309** -4.333** -5.897** 
(1.753) (1.749) (2.500) 
Bosman 9-10 0.996 0.960 -0.893 
(1.997) (1.996) (2.977) 
Bosman 11-12 2.893 2.906 0.993 
(2.093) (2.088) (3.229) 
Bosman 13-14 -1.420 -1.385 -3.464 
(2.385) (2.387) (3.504) 
Bosman  >15 1.537 1.591 -0.352 
(1.955) (1.980) (3.551) 
Regional TV Dummy -0.389 
(1.514) 
TV  1-2 -0.345 
(1.904) 
TV 3-4 0.360 
(1.826) 
TV 5-6 -1.530 
(1.861) 
TV 7-8 -1.004 
(2.440) 
TV 9-10 0.757 
(2.731) 
TV 11-12 0.366 
(2.639) 
TV 13-14 1.227 
(3.078) 
TV >15 1.940 
(3.624) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time2 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.802 0.802 0.803 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. We choose those clubs that 
have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 seasons in the pre-Bosman 
period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period. The dependent variable is defined as the 
percentage of Spanish players per club and year. The information on the Regional TVs is in 
Table 3. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical 
significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
  
 Table 5: The impact of the Bosman Case on the Spanish Soccer Players: Different Subsamples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bosman 1-2 -8.481*** -6.123*** -4.923** -9.329*** -6.864*** -4.317** 
(1.808) (1.796) (1.976) (1.710) (1.797) (1.982) 
Bosman 3-4 -18.514*** -15.479*** -13.479*** -20.104*** -17.949*** -13.707*** 
(2.189) (2.044) (2.249) (2.113) (2.062) (2.412) 
Bosman 5-6 -16.063*** -12.591*** -10.682*** -15.654*** -13.735*** -8.039** 
(2.510) (2.208) (2.767) (2.184) (2.258) (3.210) 
Bosman 7-8 -10.709*** -8.167*** -5.816 -8.169*** -7.191** -0.196 
(2.988) (2.646) (3.848) (2.637) (3.055) (4.605) 
Bosman 9-10 -7.040** -4.685 -2.522 -4.052 -2.023 5.231 
(3.065) (3.062) (4.768) (2.656) (3.708) (6.039) 
Bosman 11-12 -4.894 -2.594 -0.364 -6.545** -2.978 6.435 
(3.723) (3.636) (6.107) (3.205) (4.542) (7.614) 
Bosman 13-14 -8.396* -9.006** -5.720 -8.217** -7.838 3.759 
(4.764) (4.328) (7.496) (3.858) (5.386) (9.412) 
Bosman  >15 -8.178** -6.157* -2.845 -8.633*** -5.039 8.139 
(3.817) (3.690) (7.104) (3.263) (4.316) (9.496) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Team*Time2 No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 398 398 398 630 630 630 
R-squared 0.681 0.775 0.798 0.644 0.769 0.809 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. In Columns (1) to (3), we 
choose those clubs that have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 
seasons in the pre-Bosman period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period but excluding 
Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. Columns (4) to (6) incorporates all clubs participating in the 
First Division of the Spanish League during the period considered. The dependent variable is 
defined as the percentage of Spanish players per club and year. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical 
significance at 10% level. 
  
Table 6: The impact of the Bosman Case, Kolpak case, and Cotonou Agreement 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Bosman 1-2 -4.958*** -3.687** -4.702*** 
(1.561) (1.601) (1.607) 
Bosman 3-4 -13.716*** -11.573*** -13.262*** 
(1.692) (1.845) (1.827) 
Bosman 5-6 -10.016*** -6.813*** -9.317*** 
(1.768) (2.072) (2.055) 
Bosman 7-8 -4.309** 0.186 -3.304 
(1.753) (2.324) (2.258) 
Bosman 9-10 0.996 -4.613** 2.334 
(1.997) (2.319) (2.711) 
Bosman 11-12 2.893 -1.086 4.614 
(2.093) (2.098) (3.301) 
Bosman 13-14 -1.420 -3.599 -2.934 
(2.385) (2.287) (1.991) 
Bosman  >15 1.537 1.828 0.626 
(1.955) (1.955) (1.604) 
Kolpak case 12.380*** 
(4.239) 
Cotonou Agreement 3.992 
(4.567) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time2 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.802 0.805 0.802 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. We choose those clubs that 
have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 seasons in the pre-Bosman 
period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period. The dependent variable is defined as the 
percentage of Spanish players per club and year. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 
10% level. 
  
Table 7: The impact of the Bosman Case on the Behavior of Spanish Soccer Players 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
% Spanish 
Players 
Proportion of 
Matches in First 
Team 
Minutes 
per Match 
Goals per 
Match 
Yellow Cards  per 
Match 
Bosman 1-2 -4.958*** -0.028** -1.908 0.005 -0.523 
 (1.561) (0.012) (1.196) (0.004) (0.554) 
Bosman 3-4 -13.716*** -0.033*** -2.555** -0.002 -0.364 
 (1.692) (0.012) (1.129) (0.004) (0.380) 
Bosman 5-6 -10.016*** -0.037*** -3.440*** -0.003 -0.017 
 (1.768) (0.012) (1.106) (0.004) (0.090) 
Bosman 7-8 -4.309** -0.029** -2.505** -0.006* -0.198 
 (1.753) (0.013) (1.232) (0.004) (0.217) 
Bosman 9-10 0.996 -0.051*** -4.368*** -0.011*** -0.206 
 (1.997) (0.016) (1.435) (0.004) (0.223) 
Bosman 11-12 2.893 -0.026 -2.225 -0.016*** -0.203 
 (2.093) (0.017) (1.558) (0.004) (0.231) 
Bosman 13-14 -1.420 -0.046** -4.071** -0.014** -0.201 
 (2.385) (0.020) (1.829) (0.006) (0.240) 
Bosman  >15 1.537 -0.039 -3.288 -0.016** -0.203 
(1.955) (0.026) (2.335) (0.006) (0.248) 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team*Time Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Team*Time2 Yes No Yes No No 
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.802 0.361 0.332 0.480 0.170 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. We choose those clubs that 
have been in the First Division of the Spanish League in at least 5 seasons in the pre-Bosman 
period and in 5 seasons in the post-Bosman period. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 
10% level. 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 1 
 
 
Notes: Our sample consists of soccer players who have participated in at least 2 matches (as 
reserve or in the first team) in the seasons from 1980/81 to 2011/12. 
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